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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important deci-
sions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The purpose of the 
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered 
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other cases of interest.  As a 
special project, Associate Editors* assist in researching and writing the Re-
view.  The following topics are included in the Review:  
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THE RESPONDENT ................................................................... 461 
EVIDENCE – USE OF WITNESS PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
TESTIMONY AND PRIOR STATEMENTS MADE TO AN 
OFFICER .................................................................................... 466 
MINERAL RIGHTS & WATER LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ...................................................... 471 
WARRANTLESS URINE TESTS – EXPANDING BIRCHFIELD ........ 476 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The North Dakota Law Review Board of 2017–2018 would like to thank three of our As-
sociate Editors, Ethan Lee, Amber Cleveland, and Tanner Holten, for their hard work in 
writing this North Dakota Supreme Court Review.  
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ARBITRATION CLAUSES – DIFFERENCES IN PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENTS AND OPERATING AGREEMENTS 
Kramlich v. Hale 
 
In Kramlich v. Hale,1 both parties, Gary and Glory Kramlich and Rob-
ert and Susan Hale, appealed an order to submit their disputes to arbitration 
from the district court.2  The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that 
arbitration was in error where one contract between the parties did not ex-
plicitly approve for arbitration, even though a related contract provided for 
binding arbitration, if the arbitration provision applies only to issues arising 
from the one contract.3 
In Minot, North Dakota, Somerset–Minot, LLC operated an assisted 
living facility, which was owned by Somerset Court Partnership.4  The 
Kramlichs and the Hales were members of that partnership.5  Gary 
Kramlich and Robert Hale were members of that Limited Liability Corpora-
tion (“LLC”), but Glory Kramlich and Susan Hale were not members.6  The 
operating agreement for the LLC contained an arbitration clause, but the 
partnership agreement for the partnership did not.7 
Several issues arose between the Hales and the Kramlichs, coming 
from both the partnership agreement and the operating agreement.  Begin-
ning with the Hales’ attempt to buy the Kramlichs’ interest in both Somer-
set–Minot, LLC and Somerset Court Partnership.8 Thereafter, the 
Kramlichs denied the offers and brought this action.9  The Kramlichs 
brought the lawsuit against the Hales, the partnership, the LLC, and other 
entities, who were not parties to this appeal.10  The Kramlichs’ complaint 
alleged breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation, “attempt at pur-
chase,” embezzlement and fraud, “failure of equal distribution,” “misrepre-
sentation in corporate documents,” among other claims.11 
Based on the broad arbitration provision in the LLC operating agree-
ment, Ward County District Judge, Douglas L. Mattson, dismissed the ac-
 
1. 2017 ND 204, 901 N.W.2d 72.  
2. Kramlich, ¶ 1, 901 N.W.2d at 74. 
3. Id. ¶ 14, 901 N.W.2d at 78. 
4. Id. ¶ 2, 901 N.W.2d at 74. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Kramlich, ¶ 3, 901 N.W.2d at 74. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
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tion and ordered the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration.12  The 
district court found that the complaint was not clear.13  The plaintiffs did 
not clearly identify which defendant had violated which claim.14  Further-
more, Judge Mattson found that the arbitration provision as binding because 
of North Dakota’s strong policy of favoring the arbitration process.15  Ac-
cordingly, Judge Mattson held that arbitration was appropriate to sort out 
the issues that arose from  both the LLC and the partnership.16 
This case presented an issue of first impression for the North Dakota 
Supreme Court; namely, “whether an arbitration clause in one agreement 
may be applied to disputes arising under another agreement that lacks an 
arbitration clause . . . .”17  On appeal, the Kramlichs argued that because the 
partnership agreement did not contain an arbitration provision, the law did 
not support the district court’s determination that arbitration was appropri-
ate for issues arising from the partnership agreement.18  The Court noted 
that several jurisdictions already had an answer for the question the Court 
was answering: Colorado,19 Florida,20 Kansas,21 New Mexico,22 Oklaho-
ma,23 the Second Circuit,24 the Tenth Circuit,25 the Eleventh Circuit,26 and a 
treatise pointing the court to conclude that in this instance, the arbitration 
provision applies to issues arising out of both related agreements.27  How-
ever, the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that North Dakota al-
ready had the foundation to answer such an issue.28  The Court recognized 
 
12. Id. ¶ 4. The operating agreement stated that “Any dispute, claim, or controversy arising 
out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accord-
ance with the then current rules of the American Arbitration Association.” Id.  
13. Id. ¶ 5, 901 N.W.2d at 75. 
14. Kramlich, ¶ 5, 901 N.W.2d at 75. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. ¶ 8. 
18. Id. ¶ 6. 
19. Breaker v. Corrosion Control Corp., 23 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
20. Teel v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-640-J-32PDB, 2015 WL 1346846, at *5 (Dist. Ct. 
M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2015). 
21. Consol. Brokers Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Pan–Am. Assurance Co., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 
1083 (D. Kan. 2006).  
22. Santa Fe Tech., Inc. v. Argus Networks, Inc., 131 N.M. 772, 42 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
23. Wilkinson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 933 P.2d 878, 879 (Okla. 1997). 
24. Assoc. Brick Mason Contractors of Greater New York, Inc. v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31, 
35–36 (2d Cir. 1987). 
25. ARW Expl. Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1458 (10th Cir. 1995). 
26. Blinco v. Green Tree Serv., LLC, 400 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2005); Seaboard Coast 
Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 1982). 
27. 4 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 140:3 (3d ed. 2016). 
28. Kramlich, ¶ 13, 901 N.W.2d at 77 (citing 26th Street Hosp., LLP v. Real Builders, Inc., 
2016 ND 95, ¶ 27, 879 N.W.2d 437, 447) (“Background principles of state contract law control 
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that North Dakota law acknowledged “a strong state and federal policy fa-
voring the arbitration process, and . . . resolve[s] any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues in favor of arbitration when there is a broad arbi-
tration clause and no limitations or exclusions.”29  
Even though the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Judge 
Mattson that the issues arising out of the partnership agreement and the op-
erating agreement were interrelated, the Court placed more emphasis on the 
“this agreement” language of the operating agreement than the district 
court.30  The Court’s reasoning was distinguishable from the broad provi-
sion in 26th Street Hosp., LLP v. Real Builders, Inc.31 because even though 
the Somerset–Minot, LLC operating agreement was found to be broad by 
the district court, the plain meaning did not support expanding its language 
to encompass other contracts.32  Furthermore, the Somerset Court Partner-
ship agreement was executed almost fourteen months after the operating 
agreement was executed.33  Therefore, there was no argument that could be 
sustained claiming that the two contracts arose from the same agreement.34  
Finally, Glory Kramlich and Susan Hale were not parties to the operating 
agreement, but were parties to the partnership agreement.35  Therefore, the 
parties to each contract were not identical and did not support a finding that 
the arbitration provision should be binding on individuals who did not agree 
to be bound by such a provision.36  Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court held that the district court erred as a matter of law when it ordered ar-
bitration of the issues arising from the partnership agreement.37 
The North Dakota Supreme Court also addressed the issue of which 
law applied to the arbitration provision.38  North Dakota usually allows for 
the judiciary to decide whether an issue is one for arbitration.39  In this case, 
however, the operating agreement required arbitration to be conducted un-
 
the interpretation of the scope of an arbitration agreement, including who is bound by the agree-
ment.”). 
29. Id. (quoting Real Builders, ¶ 21, 879 N.W.2d 437); see also Schwarz v. Gierke, 2010 ND 
166, ¶ 11, 788 N.W.2d 302, 306. 
30. Kramlich, ¶ 14, 901 N.W.2d at 77 (the operating agreement stated that the arbitration 
provision applied to “[a]ny dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or relating to this agree-
ment or the breach thereof.” (Emphasis added.)). 
31. 2016 ND 95, 879 N.W.2d 437. 
32. Kramlich, ¶ 14, 901 N.W.2d at 78. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Kramlich, ¶ 15, 901 N.W.2d at 78. 
39. Id. (citing Real Builders, ¶ 23, 879 N.W.2d 437; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
537 U.S. 79, 83, 123 S. Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002)). 
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der the rules of the American Arbitration Association.40  The rules of the 
American Arbitration Association stated that the arbitrator had the authority 
to rule on such matters.41  Therefore, instead of the district judge deciding 
which issues were appropriate for arbitration, that determination was for the 
arbitrator to decide.42  After the arbitrator determines which issues arose 
from the operating agreement, the district court will decide the remaining 
issues.43 
The Kramlichs also argued that by ordering arbitration, the district 
court violated their right to a jury trial.44  However, in North Dakota, an in-
dividual can waive her right to a jury trial.45  By signing the operating 
agreement, Gary Kramlich waived his right to a jury trial, and Glory 
Kramlich waived her right to a jury trial by pursuing a claim under her hus-
band’s rights granted by the operating agreement.46 Therefore, the 
Kramlichs’ argument regarding their right to a jury trial was without mer-
it.47 
In their cross-appeal, the Hales argued that the district court should 
have dismissed the lawsuit as moot because the Hales withdrew the offer to 
buy the Kramlichs’ interest in the partnership and in the LLC.48  Even 
though the general rule is that courts may adjudicate actual controversies 
before a court, no actual controversy exists if the issue has become moot.49  
In this case, the alleged causes of action were broad enough to survive the 
withdrawal of the offer.50  Accordingly, the lawsuit was not moot.51 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court where the 
district court ordered arbitration of the issues that arose from the Somerset–
Minot, LLC’s operating agreement, but reversed the district court’s order 
for arbitration of the issues that arose from the Somerset Court Partnership 
agreement.52  Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. (quoting Real Builders, at ¶ 24). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Real Builders, ¶¶ 5–6, 879 N.W.2d 437 (affirming stay of “anything that 
cannot be arbitrated . . . pending the ordered arbitration.”)). 
44. Kramlich, ¶ 18, 901 N.W.2d at 78.  
45. Id. ¶ 19; R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 384 F.3d 157, 164 
(4th Cir. 2004) (“A party may, of course, waive the jury trial right by signing an agreement to ar-
bitrate or by binding itself to arbitration as a nonsignatory through traditional principles of con-
tract or agency law.”); see also Uniform Arbitration Act (2000) § 6 cmt. 7, 7 U.L.A. 30 (2009). 
46. Kramlich, ¶ 19, 901 N.W.2d at 78. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. ¶ 20, 901 N.W.2d at 79. 
49. Id. ¶ 21 (citing Interest of W.O., 2004 ND 8, ¶ 10, 673 N.W.2d 264). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Kramlich, ¶ 22, 901 N.W.2d at 79. 
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case to the district court. 53  The North Dakota Supreme Court instructed the 
district court to wait until the arbitrator determined which issues arose from 
the operating agreement, and are therefore arbitrable, and which issues 
arose from the partnership agreement, and are not arbitrable. 54  The district 
court could then resolve the remaining issues.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53. Id. (citing Real Builders, ¶¶ 5–6, 879 N.W.2d 437; Breaker, 23 P.3d at 1286). 
54. Id.  
55. Id.  
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CONTRACTS– FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES & NON-COMPETE 
AGREEMENTS 
Osborne v. Brown & Saenger, Inc. 
 
In Osborne v. Brown & Saenger, Inc.,56 Dawn Osborne (Osborne) ap-
pealed from a district court order granting Brown & Saenger, Inc.’s 
(Brown) motion to dismiss for improper venue.57  The North Dakota Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the forum-selection 
clause in the parties’ employment agreement violated North Dakota’s pub-
lic policy against non-compete agreements, and held the non-compete 
clause unenforceable to the extent it limits Osborne from exercising a law-
ful business in North Dakota.58 
Brown is headquartered in South Dakota and operates as a foreign 
business corporation in North Dakota.59  In 2011, Brown hired Osborne as a 
sales representative to sell office supplies to businesses.60  Osborne signed 
yearly employment contracts with Brown,61 and in January 2017, Brown 
terminated Osborne.62  
Osborne sued Brown, “alleging retaliation, improper deductions, and 
breach of contract.”63  Additionally, Osborne sought a declaratory judgment 
declaring the non-compete clause void and moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent Brown from enforcing the non-compete clause against her.64 
Brown moved to dismiss the action for improper venue arguing the forum-
selection clause in the employment agreement was valid, thus, making a 
North Dakota court an improper venue.65  The parties agreed Osborne’s 
2015 Employment Agreement was the controlling contract in this action.66  
The district court agreed with Brown and granted the motion to dis-
miss, without ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction.67  In addition 
to the present claim in North Dakota, Brown filed suit against Osborne in 
 
56. 2017 ND 288, 904 N.W.2d 34. 
57. Id. ¶ 1, 904 N.W.2d at 35. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. ¶ 2. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Osborne, ¶ 4, 904 N.W.2d at 36. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. ¶ 2, 904 N.W.2d at 35. 
67. Id. ¶ 4, 904 N.W.2d at 36. 
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Minnehaha County, South Dakota, seeking a preliminary injunction to re-
strict Osborne’s actions under the non-compete clause.68 
There are two clauses at issue in deciding Brown’s motion to dismiss – 
the non-compete clause and the choice of forum clause.69  The non-compete 
clause states, in relevant part:  
 
[E]mployee agrees not to engage directly or indirectly, either per-
sonally or as an employee, associate, partner, or otherwise, or by 
means of any corporation or other legal entity, or otherwise, in any 
business in competition with Employer and, in addition, not to so-
licit customers of Employer for Employee’s own benefit or for the 
benefit of any third party, during the term of employment and for a 
period of two (2) years from the last day of employment, within a 
100 mile radius of employment location.70 
 
The second clause at issue is the “Choice of Law/Forum” clause.71  The 
clause provides:  
 
The parties agree that this agreement is governed by the laws of 
the State of South Dakota and that the state circuit court situated in 
Minnehaha County, South Dakota, shall be the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of any disputes relating to this Agreement.72 
 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not previously addressed the 
standard of review of a district court’s granting of Rule 12(b)(3)73 motion 
on the basis of a forum-selection clause.74  Because Rule 12 is derived from 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court viewed the federal interpre-
tations of Rule 12(b)(3) as highly persuasive authority.75  In adopting a de 
novo review, the Court noted that the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Elev-
enth Circuits have determined de novo is the proper standard for reviewing 
a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss on the basis of a forum selection clause.76 
 
68. Osborne, ¶ 5, 904 N.W.2d at 37.  
69. Id. ¶ 3., 904 N.W.2d at 35-36. 
70. Id. at 36. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. N.D. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3). 
74. Osborne, ¶ 6, 904 N.W.2d at 36. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. ¶ 7, 904 N.W.2d at 36-37. 
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Osborne argued the district court erred in granting Brown’s motion to 
dismiss for improper venue because the selection of a foreign forum would 
be unreasonable and the forum-selection clause is unenforceable under 
North Dakota law.77  Where the parties have agreed in writing that an action 
may only be brought in another state and it is brought in a court of this 
state, the court will only dismiss the action if it is unfair or unreasonable to 
enforce the agreement.78  Moreover, a forum-selection clause “may be set 
aside if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum 
in which suit is brought.”79  
Osborne argued that enforcing the forum-selection clause would allow 
Brown to violate North Dakota’s strong public policy against non-compete 
agreements.80  The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to § 9-08-06 which 
provided a statutory standard for non-compete agreements.81  The Century 
Code provides, in relevant part:  “Every contract by which anyone is re-
strained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind 
is to that extent void . . . .”82  Further, it was Osborne’s contention that a 
South Dakota court would apply its own law, generally permitting non-
compete agreements, allowing Brown to circumvent Section § 9-08-06 
while utilizing the forum selection clause.83 
In determining that enforcing the forum-selection clause would permit 
§ 9-08-06 to be circumvented, the Court noted that the employment contract 
had a choice-of-law provision requiring South Dakota law to be used.84  
Since South Dakota law permits limited covenants-not-to-compete, the 
Court noted a 2012 case in which the Minnehaha County Circuit Court in 
South Dakota granted Brown a preliminary injunction against another of its 
former North Dakota employees, essentially circumventing § 9-08-06.85  As 
North Dakota case law demonstrates a strong public policy against non-
compete agreements, the Court held covenants-not-to-compete against pub-
lic policy.86  
 
77. Id. ¶ 8, 904 N.W.2d at 37. 
78. Id. ¶ 9 (citations omitted). 
79. Id. (citing Servewell Plumbing, LLC v. Federal Ins. Co., 439 F 3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 
2006) (quotations omitted)).  
80. Osborne, ¶ 10, 904 N.W.2d at 37.  
81. Id.  
82. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06. 
83. Osborne, ¶ 11, 904 N.W.2d at 37. 
84. Id. ¶ 12. 
85. Id. at 37-38. 
86. Id. ¶ 13, 904 N.W.2d at 38. 
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Furthermore, § 28-04.1-03(5) “prevents enforcement of a forum-
selection clause if enforcement would be unfair or unreasonable . . . .”87  In 
determining enforcement of the forum-selection clause would be unfair and 
unreasonable, the Court reasoned enforcement would “facilitate enforce-
ment of the non-compete clause in a foreign court to restrain competition” 
by North Dakota people in the state of North Dakota.88  Further, “another 
state’s forum applying that state’s law to the non-compete clause would 
violate North Dakota’s public policy against non-compete agreements.”89  
Thus, the Court determined the forum-selection clause is “unenforceable 
because the non-compete clause is unenforceable.”90 
Because North Dakota has an interest in protecting its strong public 
policy against non-compete agreements from evasion, the Court held the 
Choice of Law/Forum clause unenforceable.91  In addition, the Court held 
that the non-compete clause is unenforceable under § 9-08-06 to the extent 
it limits Osborne from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business in 
North Dakota.92  In holding the two clauses unenforceable, the Court re-
versed the district court’s order granting Brown’s motion to dismiss and 
remanded for further proceedings.93  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87. Id. ¶ 14. 
88. Id. 
89. Osborne, ¶ 14, 904 N.W.2d at 38. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. ¶ 16, 904 N.W.2d at 39. 
93. Id. ¶ 17.  
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EVIDENCE – STATE’S USE OF AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT 
APPOINTED UNDER N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 ON BEHALF OF THE 
RESPONDENT 
In the Matter of Gomez 
 
In the Matter of Gomez94, Joshua Gomez appealed an order of civil 
commitment after the court determined he was a sexually dangerous indi-
vidual.95  In this matter of first impression, Gomez argued it was an error to 
allow the State to call an expert appointed on his behalf as a witness.96  Ul-
timately, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court order 
because Gomez failed to object to the production of expert testimony re-
ports.97 
On July 13, 2015, North Dakota sought to have Gomez committed as a 
sexually dangerous individual.98 On July 16, 2015, the district court ordered 
the North Dakota State Hospital to evaluate Gomez.99  In addition, Gomez, 
an indigent party, requested an independent examination.100  After confirm-
ing that Gomez was indigent, the district court appointed Dr. Stacey Benson 
as an independent examiner.101  In December of 2016, a district court treat-
ment hearing was held and testimony was heard from the following people:  
Dr. Benson, the North Dakota State Hospital evaluator, two private evalua-
tors retained by Gomez, and Gomez himself.102 
Throughout the discovery process, the State requested that Gomez pro-
duce “[a]ny and all reports and tests used by an independent examiner.”103  
However, Gomez did not produce a copy of the report or any other infor-
mation prepared by Dr. Benson.104  More importantly, Gomez did not assert 
any objection to the discovery request.105  Prior to the hearing, Gomez filed 
the reports prepared by his private evaluators and the State filed the report 
of the North Dakota State Hospital evaluator.106  Notably, Mr. Gomez did 
 
94. 2018 ND 16, 906 N.W.2d 87. 
95. Gomez, ¶ 1, 906 N.W.2d at 89. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. ¶ 2. 
99. Id.  
100. Id. 
101. Gomez, ¶ 2, 906 N.W.2d at 89. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. ¶ 3. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. ¶ 4. 
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not file the report of the independent examiner appointed on his behalf, Dr. 
Benson.107 
Subsequently, the State sought an order for release of Dr. Benson’s re-
port.108  The district court ordered Dr. Benson to release her report, and it 
was subsequently filed with the district court.109  At the hearing, the State 
called Dr. Benson as a witness.110  Gomez objected, arguing the State was 
prohibited from calling Dr. Benson as a witness pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 
26(b)(4)(B).111  Additionally, Gomez noted Dr. Benson was appointed pur-
suant to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 and argued that the statute gives him the 
option to either call or not call an independent examiner.112  Nonetheless, 
the district court ordered Dr. Benson to testify, concluding N.D.C.C. § 25-
03.3-13 allows for any expert testimony or report to be admissible.113 
Dr. Benson diagnosed Gomez with antisocial personality disorder and 
noted he had a high risk of reoffending.114  Similarly, the State Hospital 
evaluator and one of Gomez’s private evaluators115 concluded Gomez suf-
fered from antisocial personality disorder.116  One of Gomez’s private eval-
uators testified that Gomez omitted some information during his evaluation 
which would have changed his opinion regarding Gomez’s likelihood to 
reoffend.117  The other private evaluator Gomez hired, testified he did not 
believe Gomez had antisocial personality disorder and that the State failed 
to meet its burden.118 
On March 29, 2017, the district court entered judgment stating that 
Gomez must be committed after determining Gomez was a sexually dan-
gerous individual.119  Gomez appealed the district court’s order, arguing 
that the district court erred by ordering Dr. Benson to testify.120 
Sexually dangerous individual commitment proceedings are civil pro-
ceedings, and, thus, the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure govern.121  
 
107. Gomez, ¶ 4, 906 N.W.2d at 89. 
108. Id. ¶ 5. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. ¶ 6. 
111. Id. ¶ 6 (noting N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B) limits the scope of discovery for experts re-
tained for the purpose of trial preparation and who are not intended to be called as a witness.). 
112. Id.  
113. Gomez, ¶ 6, 906 N.W.2d at 90. 
114. Id. ¶ 7. 
115. Id. (noting Gomez’s privately retained evaluator diagnosed Gomez with some mild sub-
stance use disorders.). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Gomez, ¶ 8, 906 N.W.2d at 90. 
120. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
121. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Matter of Hehn, 2015 ND 218, ¶ 17, 868 N.W.2d 551). 
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The district court has discretion when admitting expert testimony, and the 
North Dakota Supreme Court will not reverse a decision absent an abuse of 
discretion.122  “An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court is un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in rendering its decision.”123  
Gomez argued the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 precluded the 
State from calling an expert who was appointed by the court on behalf of 
the respondent.124  The review of a district court’s interpretation of a statute 
is de novo.125  N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 provides that “the court shall appoint 
a qualified expert to perform an examination or participate in the commit-
ment proceedings on the respondent’s behalf.”126 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has previously held an indigent re-
spondent does not have the right to select his/her own independent expert 
under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12.127  However, it was an issue of first impres-
sion before the North Dakota Supreme Court whether an independent ex-
pert appointed pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 should be treated like a 
privately retained expert or like a court-appointed expert.128  Gomez argued 
an examiner appointed under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 should be treated as a 
private expert and subject to the disclosure limitations of N.D.R.Civ.P. 
26(b)(4)(B).129 Specifically, the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure lim-
it the scope of discovery for experts prepared for trial preparation and those 
not intended to be called to testify.130 
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Gomez in that an inde-
pendent examiner appointed under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 should be treated 
as a private examiner retained by the respondent.131  Specifically, N.D.C.C. 
§ 25-03.3-12 provides the respondent an opportunity to retain their own ex-
pert, or if they are indigent, the court shall appoint an expert to balance out 
North Dakota commitment proceedings which requires the district court to 
order an expert evaluation.132  Notably absent from N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 
 
122. Id. (citing Rittenour v. Gibson, 2003 ND 14, ¶ 29, 656 N.W.2d 691). 
123. Id. (quoting Rittenour, ¶ 13, 656 N.W.2d at 695). 
124. Id. ¶ 11. 
125. Gomez, ¶ 11, 906 N.W.2d at 90 (citing Matter of G.R.H., 2011 ND 21, ¶ 13, 793 
N.W.2d 460). 
126. Id. ¶ 11, at 91 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-12). 
127. Id. ¶ 12 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-12; Matter of Loy, 2015 ND 92, ¶ 13, 862 
N.W.2d 500). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id.; N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B). 
131. Gomez, ¶ 12, 906 N.W.2d. at 91. 
132. Id. ¶ 13. 
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is any language that compels the disclosure of an indigent respondent’s ex-
pert.133 
The district court concluded N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 allows all expert 
reports to be admitted into evidence, relying on the language “any testimo-
ny and reports of an expert who conducted an examination are admissi-
ble.”134  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that this lan-
guage is meant to avoid the effects of hearsay.135 The North Dakota 
Supreme Court stated that construing the language of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-
13 in this way would be inconsistent with N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12, which 
allows a respondent to retain or have appointed their own expert to perform 
an evaluation, and N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B), which allows the retention of 
experts for the purpose of trial preparation, but not for testimonial purpos-
es.136 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court ultimately concluded 
“N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 does not eliminate a respondent’s right to retain an 
expert for the purpose of trial and potentially be subject to the discovery 
limitations provided in N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B).”137 
Nonetheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court decision, stating that Gomez waived his ability to prevent Dr. Benson 
from testifying because Gomez failed to object to the State’s discovery re-
quest.138  Specifically, the State demanded Gomez produce “any and all re-
ports used by any independent examiner.”139  A request for the production 
of documents is governed by N.D.R.Civ.P. 34.140 Moreover, under 
N.D.R.Civ.P. 34, Gomez was required to object to any demand that he pro-
duce any document.141  Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that 
“the failure to serve an objection to an interrogatory or request for produc-
tion within the thirty-day period prescribed by Rules 33 and 34 constitutes a 
waiver.”142 
Gomez also argued that his non-disclosure was effectively an objec-
tion.143  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, stating that 
 
133. Id. ¶ 14. 
134. Id. ¶ 15 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. ¶ 15, 906 N.W.2d at 92 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13; N.D. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(4)(B)). 
137. Gomez, ¶ 16, 906 N.W.2d at 92 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13; N.D. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(4)(B)). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B)). 
142. Id. (quoting Voracheck v. Citizens State Bank of Lankin, 421 N.W.2d 45, 52 (N.D. 
1988)). 
143. Gomez, ¶ 17, 906 N.W.2d at 92. 
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N.D.R.Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) requires a timely objection and N.D.R.Civ. P. 26 
requires a party to take affirmative action when claiming information is 
privileged.144  Here, Gomez failed to timely object and failed to comply 
with the requirements of N.D.R.Civ.P. 26.145  Therefore, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court held that Gomez ultimately waived his objection to the ad-
mission of Dr. Benson’s testimony and the district court’s order was af-
firmed.146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144. Id. (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A)). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
             
466 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:2 
EVIDENCE – USE OF WITNESS PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
TESTIMONY AND PRIOR STATEMENTS MADE TO AN 
OFFICER 
State v. Azure 
 
In State v. Azure,147 Duane Azure, Sr. (“Azure”) appealed a criminal 
judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault.148  
Azure argued the district court had abused its discretion by admitting into 
evidence two prior statements of a State’s witness.149  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court because the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in allowing Agent Allen Kluth (“Agent 
Kluth”) to testify about the prior statements made by the victim (“the vic-
tim”).150 
On April 20, 2014, a deputy was sent to Azure’s residence after receiv-
ing numerous calls.151  Upon arrival, the deputy discovered the victim lying 
on the floor.152  The deputy called an ambulance and the victim was trans-
ported to a local emergency room.153  The victim explained to law enforce-
ment and medical personnel that her injuries were caused by a fall.154  
However, approximately two weeks later, the victim contacted law en-
forcement and stated her injuries were not caused by a fall; instead she ex-
plained Azure assaulted her.155  The victim was interviewed by Agent Kluth 
of the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation.156  During this inter-
view, the victim restated that Azure assaulted her and, moreover, that she 
was afraid to say anything at first.157  Subsequently, Azure was charged 
with aggravated assault.158 
Azure called the victim as a witness for the preliminary hearing.159  On 
direct examination, Azure questioned the victim on the different explana-
tions she gave for her injuries.160  The district court found probable cause 
 
147. 2017 ND 195, 899 N.W.2d 294. 
148. Azure, ¶ 1, 899 N.W.2d at 296. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. ¶ 2, 899 N.W.2d at 297. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Azure, ¶ 2, 899 N.W.2d at 297. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id.  
159. Id. ¶ 3. 
160. Azure, ¶ 3, 899 N.W.2d at 297. 
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existed and set the case for trial.161  Before Azure’s jury trial, the victim 
died from unrelated causes.162 
Due to the victim’s death, the State moved to allow the following:  (1) 
the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony and (2) the victim’s statements 
to Agent Kluth.163  Despite Azure’s objections, the district court granted the 
State’s motion and the evidence was admitted.164  Subsequently, a jury 
found Azure guilty of aggravated assault.165  On appeal, Azure argued the 
district court erred in the following ways:  (1) allowing the victim’s prelim-
inary hearing testimony into evidence at trial; (2) allowing Agent Kluth to 
testify about the victim’s statements made in the hospital; and (3) denying 
his motion for judgment of acquittal.166  Under the abuse of discretion 
standard, “A district court has broad discretion in evidentiary matters, and 
we will not overturn a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence 
unless the court abused its discretion.”167  Therefore, the abuse of discretion 
standard applies when reviewing a district court’s evidentiary rulings under 
the hearsay rule.168  
First, prior to Azure’s trial, the State moved to allow the victim’s pre-
liminary hearing testimony under N.D.R.Ev. 804(b)(1) (“Rule 804”).169  
Rule 804 sets out circumstances where hearsay evidence is allowed when 
the declarant is unavailable.170  One of those circumstances arises when the 
testimony: 
 
 [W]as given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, 
whether given during the current proceedings or a different one; 
and is now offered against a party who had, or, in a civil case, 
whose predecessor in interest had, an opportunity and similar mo-
tive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.171 
 
Importantly, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated it is immaterial if 
the defendant had significantly less incentive to cross-examine the witness 
 
161. Id.  
162. Id. 
163. Id. ¶ 4. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Azure, ¶ 5, 899 N.W.2d at 297. 
167. Id.  ¶ 6 (quoting State v. Vandermeer, 2014 ND 46, ¶ 6, 843 N.W.2d 686 (internal cita-
tions omitted)). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. ¶ 7. 
170. Id. ¶ 8 (citing N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)). 
171. Id. at 597-98 (citing N.D. R. EVID. 804 (b)(1)). 
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at the preliminary examination, so long as the requirements of Rule 804 
have been met.172  Essentially, Azure argued he did not have a similar mo-
tive.173  Azure argued that at the preliminary hearing his motive was to es-
tablish the victim had fabricated her story in an effort to pursue a civil suit 
against him.174  
The North Dakota Supreme Court ruled Azure’s questioning at the pre-
liminary hearing was to discredit the victim by showing she made incon-
sistent statements and, moreover, to show that the victim has an ulterior 
motive.175  The Court stated Azure had failed to show how his motivation to 
question the victim at trial, if she had, would have been different from his 
motive at the preliminary hearing.176  Thus, the Court held that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion with regard to this argument.177 
The second argument discussed by the North Dakota Supreme Court 
was regarding Agent Kluth’s testimony about the victim’s statements to 
him.178  The district court allowed the statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
(“Rule 801”).179  Under Rule 801, a statement is not hearsay if it meets the 
following conditions:  
 
(1) the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about 
a prior statement, and the statement: . . . (B) is consistent with the 
declarant’s testimony and is offered; (i) to rebut an express or im-
plied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a 
recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or (ii) to re-
habilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on 
another ground.180  
 
The North Dakota Supreme Court framed this issue of first impression 
in the following way:  whether the declarant must testify at the trial itself, 
before the declarant’s prior consistent statements are admissible under Rule 
801(d)(1)(B).181 
 
172. Azure, ¶ 8, 899 N.W.2d at 298 (citing State v. Garvey, 283 N.W.2d 153, 156 (N.D. 
1979)). 
173. Id. ¶ 9. 
174. Id.  
175. Id. ¶ 11. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Azure, ¶ 12, 899 N.W.2d at 298. 
179. Id. (citing N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)). 
180. Id. (quoting N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)). 
181. Id. ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 299. 
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Due to the identical language of N.D.R.Ev. 801(d)(1)(B) and Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), the North Dakota Supreme Court considered federal 
precedence as persuasive.182  The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that 
the language of the rule indicates that the declarant’s availability at trial is 
required.183  Moreover, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted the majority 
of Federal Circuit Courts require that the declarant testify at trial.184  Based 
on the circuit court decisions, the language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), and the 
Advisory Committee Notes for the Federal Rules of Evidence, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court held that the declarant must testify at the trial for 
which it is being offered.185  Because the victim did not testify during the 
trial, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district court abused its 
discretion in allowing Kluth to testify about statements the victim made.186 
Similarly, N.D.R.Ev. 801(d)(1) requires the opportunity to cross-
examine the person who made the statement and this requirement cannot be 
satisfied by simply cross-examining someone who heard the statement.187  
Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that a district court’s evidentiary error 
does not warrant a new trial if the error was harmless.188  Therefore, the 
Court considered the entire record and decided in light of all the evidence 
that the error was so prejudicial to warrant a new trial.189  The Court specif-
ically reasoned that Agent Kluth’s testimony was not merely cumulative 
and included substantially more information than the victim’s preliminary 
hearing testimony.190  Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that 
allowing Kluth’s testimony was not harmless.191 
Third, and finally, Azure agues the district court abused its discretion 
by denying his motion for acquittal.192  Azure argues his conviction should 
be reversed due to insufficient evidence.193  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court noted: 
 
182. Id. ¶ 14 (citing State v. Randall, 2002 ND 16, ¶ 5, 639 N.W.2d 439). 
183. Id. ¶ 17. 
184. Azure, ¶ 18, 899 N.W.2d at 299-300 (citing United States v. Frazier, 469 F.3d 85, 88 
(3d Cir. 2006); Dillon v. Warden, Ross Correctional Inst., 541 Fed.Appx. 599, 605 (6th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Collicott, 92 
F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 758 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
185. Id. ¶ 19, 899 N.W.2d at 300. 
186. Id. ¶ 20. 
187. Id. ¶ 21. 
188. Id. ¶ 22 (citing City of Grafton v. Wosick, 2013 ND 74, ¶ 12, 830 N.W.2d 550).  
189. Id. (citing State v. Doppler, 2013 ND 54, ¶ 21, 828 N.W.2d 502; State v Leinen, 1999 
ND 138, ¶ 17, 598 N.W.2d 102). 
190. Azure, ¶ 23, 899 N.W.2d at 300-01. 
191. Id. ¶ 24, 899 N.W.2d at 301. 
192. Id. ¶ 25. 
193. Id.  
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[a] conviction rests upon insufficient evidence only when, after re-
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution 
and giving the prosecution the benefit of all inferences reasonably 
to be drawn in its favor, no rational fact finder could find the de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.194 
 
Moreover, the defendant must show the evidence permits no reasonable in-
ference of guilt.195 
Azure argued that without the victim testimony evidence mentioned 
and discussed earlier in this case, there was insufficient evidence to support 
the conviction.196  However, as previously discussed, the victim’s prelimi-
nary hearing testimony was admissible at trial.197  Moreover, there was cor-
roborating testimony from a doctor who testified that the victim’s injuries 
were inconsistent with a fall.198  Therefore, this evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, permitted a reasonable inference of 
guilt.199  In conclusion, because the district court abused its discretion by 
allowing Kluth to testify regarding the victim’s prior statements, and be-
cause it was not a harmless error, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed 
the judgment and remanded for a new trial.200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194. Id. (citing State v. Putney, 2016 ND 59, ¶ 8, 877 N.W.2d 28 (internal citation omitted)). 
195. Id. (citing State v. Gonzalez, 2000 ND 32, ¶ 14, 606 N.W.2d 873). 
196. Azure, ¶ 27, 899 N.W.2d at 301. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. ¶ 28, 899 N.W.2d at 301-02. 
199. Id. at 302. 
200. Id. ¶ 29.  
             
2018] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 471 
MINERAL RIGHTS & WATER LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Wilkinson v. Board of University and School Lands 
 
In Wilkinson v. Board of University and School Lands,201 successors in 
interest to land appealed, and Statoil & Gap, LP (“Statoil”) and EOG Re-
sources, Inc. (“EOG”) cross-appealed, from a district court order granting 
the Board of University and School Lands (“Board”) and State Engineer’s 
motion for summary judgment determining the Board owns certain property 
below the ordinary high watermark of the Missouri River.202  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded203 because the statute that 
governed mineral rights of land inundated by certain dams applied retroac-
tively and the district court erroneously made findings on disputed facts.  
The Wilkinsons previously acquired title to property located in Wil-
liams County.204  In 1958, the Wilkinson’s conveyed surface rights to the 
property to the United States for construction and operation of the Garrison 
Dam and Reservoir, but reserved oil and gas rights in and under the proper-
ty.205  In 2012, the Plaintiffs, as successors in interest to the Wilkinsons, 
brought an action to determine the ownership of the minerals in and under 
the property, alleging they own the mineral interests.206  The plaintiffs also 
sued Brigham Oil & Gas, LLP (“Brigham”) and EOG Resources, Inc. 
(“EOG”) to determine their rights, alleging Brigham received an oil and gas 
lease from the State and EOG from the plaintiffs.207  The plaintiffs filed an 
amended complaint adding Statoil Oil & Gas LP (“Statoil”) and XTO Ener-
gy, Inc. (“XTO”) as defendants alleging Statoil acquired Brigham and held 
an oil and gas lease from the Board.208  The plaintiffs sought injunctive re-
lief and a declaration regarding the ownership of mineral interests in 
property, and alleged a takings claim, deprivation of constitutional rights, 
conversion, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.209  
In their motion for summary judgment, the Board and State Engineer 
(collectively “State”) argued that the State holds title to the bed of the Mis-
souri River up to the current ordinary high watermark and that the disputed 
 
201. 2017 ND 231, 903 N.W.2d 51.  
202. Wilkinson, ¶ 1, 904 N.W.2d at 53. 
203. Id. at 54. 
204. Id. ¶ 2. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
207. Id. ¶ 3.  
208. Wilkinson, ¶ 6, 904 N.W.2d at 54. 
209. Id. 
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property is located below the current ordinary high watermark.210  Further, 
the State argued the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
because the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies, no tak-
ing occurred, and that the plaintiffs’ claim for deprivation of constitutional 
rights was improper.211  XTO joined the State’s request that the court decide 
the State holds title to the disputed minerals.212  
In response to the State’s motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs 
argued: 
 
[The] property is not part of the State’s sovereign lands, there was 
no navigable body of water on the property at the time of state-
hood, the surface property was purchased by the United States as 
part of the Garrison Project, the property was flooded by Lake Sa-
kakawea, the property is located above the historical ordinary high 
watermark, and [that] they alleged sufficient facts to support their 
takings claim.213  
 
Statoil further argued that the property under Lake Sakakawea is not 
sovereign land owned by the State because the lake was man-made, it was 
not navigable at the time of statehood, and the property is located outside 
Lake Sakakawea and below the current ordinary high watermark of the 
Missouri River.214  
After the State Engineer intervened, the district court granted Board 
and Engineer’s motion for summary judgment.215  On appeal, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court considered four issues: whether the district court 
correctly determined ownership of the surface estate; whether the statute 
that governs mineral rights of land inundated by certain dams applied retro-
actively; whether successors were entitled to compensation if state-owned 
disputed minerals; and whether the district court made findings on disputed 
facts.216  
The first issue the Supreme Court of North Dakota discussed was the 
district’s conclusion that the property interests in dispute are the sovereign 
land of the State.217  As the Court noted, the district court decided owner-
 
210. Id. ¶ 7.  
211. Id. 
212. Id. ¶ 8, 903 N.W.2d at 55. 
213. Id. at 54-55. 
214. Wilkinson, ¶ 8, 903 N.W.2d at 55.  
215. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. 
216. Id. ¶ 13, 903 N.W.2d at 56. 
217. Id. ¶ 11, 903 N.W.2d at 55.  
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ship of the surface estate when it granted summary judgment, although the 
parties only requested the district court decide ownership of the mineral in-
terests.218 However, when declaratory relief is sought, anyone who has or 
claims any interest affected by the declaration must be made a party, and 
the declaration may not prejudice the rights of anyone not made a party to 
the proceeding.219 Because the Wilkinsons conveyed the surface property to 
the United States in 1958, the United States appeared to have an interest in 
the property that would be affected by the district court’s declaration that 
the State owned both the surface and minerals of the property.220  Thus, be-
cause the United States was not a party to this proceeding, the district court 
erred in determining ownership of the surface estate.221 
Next, the Court considered the district court’s determination that the 
State owned the mineral interests at issue.222  After the district court entered 
summary judgment and while this case was pending, Chapter 61-33.1223 
was enacted into the North Dakota Century Code and governs mineral 
rights of land inundated by the Pick-Sloan Missouri Project dams.224  Gen-
erally, the Court will apply the law in effect when the cause of action arose; 
however, when a law is enacted or amended while an appeal is pending and 
it applies retroactively, courts will generally apply the new law.225  Alt-
hough the proceedings in this case began in 2012, and the district court 
granted summary judgment in May 2016, the bill which enacted Chapter 
61-33.1 states: 
 
[The chapter] is retroactive to the date of closure of the Pick-Sloan 
Missouri basin project dams. The ordinary high water mark deter-
mination under this Act is retroactive and applies to all oil and gas 
wells spud after January 1, 2006, for purposes of oil and gas min-
eral and royalty ownership.226 
 
 In determining that Chapter 61-33.1 applies retroactively, the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota remanded for consideration of whether Chapter 61-
33.1 applies to the property in this matter since the district court did not 
 
218. Id. ¶ 13. 
219. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-23-11). 
220. Wilkinson, ¶ 13, 903 N.W.2d at 56 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1313).  
221. Id. (citations omitted).  
222. Id. ¶14. 
223. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 61-33.1. 
224. Wilkinson, ¶ 14, 903 N.W.2d at 56.  
225. Id. ¶ 17 (citations omitted).  
226. Id. ¶ 19 (citing 2017 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 426, § 4).  
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have the opportunity to consider the statutory provisions when deciding 
ownership of the disputed minerals.227 
The third issue the Court considered was whether the district court 
erred in determining the State’s action did not violate the Takings Clauses 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, 
Section 16 of the North Dakota Constitution.228  As provided by both Con-
stitutions, the State has the power to “take” or “damage” private property 
for public use if it compensates the owner for the taking or damage.229  Alt-
hough the federal government compensated the plaintiffs for the surface 
property, they failed to compensate them for the mineral interests.230  The 
Supreme Court of North Dakota determined the district court erred in de-
termining there was no taking simply because the plaintiffs were able to 
lease the mineral interests numerous times prior to the State claiming own-
ership.231  In reversing and remanding this issue for prior consideration, the 
Court noted the district court must consider the issue on remand if it decides 
the State owns the disputed minerals.232  
Finally, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the 
district court made findings on disputed factual issues as summary judg-
ment is not appropriate if there are genuine issues of material fact.233  Be-
cause the parties disputed whether the property at issue was flooded be-
cause of the Garrison Project and part of Lake Sakakawea, the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota determined the district court erred in making find-
ings on disputed facts and remanded for further proceedings.234 
Because the district court could not determine the ownership of the sur-
face estate235 and erroneously made findings on disputed facts236, the Court 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.237  Additionally, because 
the statute the governed mineral rights of land inundated by certain dams 
applied retroactively, the district court must apply the statute to determine if 
the State owns the mineral rights238 and, if the State does own the mineral 
 
227. Id. ¶¶ 19-20.  
228. Id. ¶ 22.  
229. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Irwin v. City of Minot, 2015 ND 60, ¶ 6, 860 N.W.2d 849).  
230. Wilkinson, ¶ 22, 903 N.W.2d at 58.  
231. Id. ¶ 24. 
232. Id. ¶ 25, 903 N.W.2d at 59. 
233. Id. ¶ 26.  
234. Id. ¶ 28.  
235. Id. ¶ 13, 903 N.W.2d at 56. 
236. Wilkinson, ¶ 28, 903 N.W.2d at 59. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. ¶ 20, 903 N.W.2d at 58. 
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interests, whether the State’s actions constituted a taking in violation of the 
North Dakota and United States Constitution.239  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
239. Id. ¶ 25, 903 N.W.2d at 59. 
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WARRANTLESS URINE TESTS – EXPANDING BIRCHFIELD 
State v. Helm 
 
In State v. Helm,240 Steven Helm (“Helm”) was charged with and pros-
ecuted for refusing to submit to a warrantless urine test after being pulled 
over for driving under the influence.241  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
held that Helm’s refusal to provide a urine sample could not result in a 
criminal conviction, because doing so was a violation of Helm’s Fourth 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution to be free from un-
reasonable search and seizure.242  In doing so, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court expanded the United States Supreme Court’s holing in Birchfield v. 
North Dakota243 to include warrantless urine tests as an unreasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment.244  Therefore, a defendant in North Dakota 
cannot be criminally charged with failing to submit to a warrantless blood 
test, under Birchfield, or urine test, under Helm.245 
In May 2016, Helm was pulled over for driving without headlights.246  
During the stop, Helm was arrested for driving under the influence of a con-
trolled substance.247  Helm refused to submit to a warrantless urine test in-
cident to his lawful arrest.248  The State then charged Helm with refusing to 
submit to a chemical test.249  Subsequently, Helm’s motion to dismiss the 
refusal charge was granted by the District Court of Cass County.250 The dis-
trict court found that the warrantless urine test was similar to the warrant-
less blood test that the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional 
in Birchfield, and therefore Helm’s Fourth Amendment right had been vio-
lated.251 
After Helm’s arrest, the North Dakota Legislature amended Section 39-
20-01(3)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code to comply with Birchfield by 
removing the blood test provision, but left the urine test provision intact.252  
 
240. 2017 ND 207, 901 N.W.2d 57. 
241. Helm, ¶ 2, 901 N.W.2d at 58. 
242. Id. ¶ 16, 901 N.W.2d at 63. 
243. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (in which the United States Supreme Court consolidated State v. 
Birchfield, 2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302; Beylund v. Levi, 2015 ND 18, 859 N.W.2d 403; and 
State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015)). 
244. Helm, ¶ 16, 901 N.W.2d at 63. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. ¶ 2, 901 N.W.2d at 58. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. Helm, ¶ 3, 901 N.W.2d at 58. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. ¶ 4, 901 N.W.2d at 58 n.1. 
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Section 39-08-01 made it a crime for a driver to refuse to submit to a law 
enforcement officer’s request for a chemical test, which, pre-Birchfield, in-
cluded blood, breath, or urine.253  Section 39-20-01 of the North Dakota 
Century Code houses North Dakota’s implied consent statute, stating that 
by driving on a North Dakota highway, the driver consents to chemical test-
ing.254  Section 39-20-01(3)(a) specifically authorized a law enforcement 
officer to determine which test would be appropriate to administer to the 
driver.255  This section also provided the authority to charge the refusing 
driver as though the driver had been driving under the influence.256 
The State’s argument on appeal was that the warrantless urine test was 
constitutional because it did not require the driver to expose his genitals.257  
The State argued that by adopting a requirement that the driver’s genitals 
not be exposed, the warrantless urine test would be categorically reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.258 However, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court was unpersuaded by this argument.259  Instead, the Court found that 
urine tests were searches under the Fourth Amendment.260  The Court fur-
ther found that searches done without a warrant are per se unreasonable 
with only a few limited exceptions.261 
The North Dakota Supreme Court also noted that both Helm and Birch-
field involved a search incident to a lawful arrest.262  However, Birchfield 
was different from Helm because Birchfield explicitly dealt with blood 
tests, while Helm was a question of the validity of warrantless urine tests.263  
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that Birchfield relied on three fac-
tors in assessing the intrusion of privacy that blood and breath tests pre-
sent.264  The first factor Birchfield relied on was “the extent of the physical 
intrusion upon the individual to obtain the evidence.”265  The second factor 
was “the extent to which the evidence could be preserved to provide addi-
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tional, unrelated private information.”266  The third factor was “the extent to 
which participation in the search would enhance the embarrassment of the 
arrest.”267  
Based on those three factors, the United States Supreme Court in 
Birchfield reasoned that a breath test was not a significant privacy concern 
because once the test was completed, there was no sample left, and the only 
fact that could be determined about the driver was the drivers blood alcohol 
concentration; and further that a breath test did not enhance embarrassment 
beyond the embarrassment inherent in any arrest.268 Alternatively, the Court 
in Birchfield found that blood tests implicated privacy concerns, which rose 
to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation when administered without a 
warrant.269  Under the Birchfield three-factor analysis, the United States 
Supreme Court found that piercing the skin to extract part of a driver’s body 
is significantly more intrusive than a breath test, and that a blood test can be 
preserved and can be used to reveal other private information beyond the 
necessary blood alcohol reading required for a conviction of driving under 
the influence.270 
Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court looked to Minnesota juris-
prudence to address whether warrantless urine tests administered incidental 
to a lawful arrest were constitutional, specifically State v. Thompson,271 
which addressed the issue within the framework created by Birchfield.272 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Thompson held that warrantless urine 
tests were unconstitutional as a search incident to a lawful arrest.273  Specif-
ically, the court in Thompson found that a urine test was similar to a breath 
test regarding the physical intrusion on the driver’s body.274  However, the 
Thompson Court also found that a urine test was similar to a blood test be-
cause both could be preserved and used to obtain facts about the driver be-
yond the necessary blood alcohol concentration.275  The Thompson Court 
also found that there was a significant privacy violation because of the em-
barrassment that a driver being observed “void[ing] directly into [a] bot-
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tle”276 could cause.277  Therefore, the Thompson Court held that a driver 
who refuses to submit to a warrantless urine test, although incident to a law-
ful arrest, could not be convicted for refusing to submit to a warrantless 
urine test.278 
In Helm, the State argued that Helm was not under the influence of al-
cohol at the time of his arrest, making his case distinguishable from Thomp-
son.279  Rather, the State contended that because Helm was under the influ-
ence of drugs, there was no less intrusive test than a urine test.280  Finally, 
the State argued that by adopting a categorical rule for urine collection not 
requiring a law enforcement officer to see the driver’s genitals, no Fourth 
Amendment violation would occur.281  Ultimately, the North Dakota Su-
preme Court was not persuaded by the State’s final argument.282 
Instead, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the categorical 
approach favored by the State did not meet the minimum standards set out 
by the United States Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives’ Association283 or Notational Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab,284 because the State’s approach was a case-by-case analysis left to an 
officer’s discretion and lacked guidelines or instructions for officer’s visual 
observations.285  The North Dakota Supreme Court also found that the 
Fourth Amendment is not only concerned with the privacy concern associ-
ated with visual observation of a driver providing the urine sample, it is also 
concerned with the driver being forced to urinate in the presence of a law 
enforcement officer.286  Finally, the Court found that the State made no ef-
fort to explain how its categorical rule would alleviate the privacy concerns 
dealing with the preservation of the urine sample and the information that 
could be obtained from it.287  Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
declined to adopt the State’s proposed rule for urine testing incident to a 
lawful arrest.288 
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Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Minnesota 
Supreme Court precedent and upheld Helm’s motion to dismiss.289  The 
Court specifically held that the government cannot prosecute a driver for 
refusing to submit to a warrantless urine test.290  Therefore, the district court 
did not err when it dismissed the charge against Helm for refusing to submit 
to a warrantless urine test.291 
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